Jonas Bunte, December 5th 2005
Shockingly weak Shock-Facility for the Weak
Analysis of the new IMF-Exogenous Shocks Facility (ESF)
On Wednesday, November 23rd, the IMF was to approve the “Exogenous Shocks Facility”(ESF).
It will become effective once the G8-debt cancellation, by now called “Multilateral Debt Relief
Initiative (MDRI)”, is officially implemented. This facility outlined by the IMF provides loans to
countries hit by an external shock such as a natural disaster or a Terms-of-Trade-Shock. Such
an instrument is possibly very useful in smoothing the negative impacts of such shocks. Hence,
the IMF was expected to introduce a successor to the old compensation facility CCF that had not
been used since 2000.
Summary of the positive and negative points to the ESF:
- + A facility to provide assistance in the case of exogenous shocks is needed, as developing
countries are especially vulnerable.
- + It is furthermore encouraging that the assistance will now be given on concessional terms.
- + Providing assistance in the basis of “first give, then look”- is appropriate as the slow
disbursement of funds was a problem with previous compensation mechanisms.
- - However, this attempt of a quick disbursement is contradictory to various conditions that
need to be met in order to trigger the disbursement.
- - Whether these conditions are met is subject to discretionary judgments by the Fund as
there are no definitions given, e.g. of what constitutes an exogenous shock.
- - The timeframe of the assistance is inconsistent with World Bank and IMF findings on the
persistence of exogenous shocks.
- - No justification is given why only LICs should be eligible for assistance under the ESF.
- - The amounts available to the eligible countries might be insufficient.
- - It is not clear how the loans given under this facility relate to the G8-plan to wipe out all
debt owed to the IMF by Post-CP HIPCs. Similarly, it is unclear how it relates to the
DSF.
This preliminary assessment of the ESF is structured as follows: First the characteristics of the
ESF will be presented. Then a critical assessment of the proposal is undertaken starting with
addressing the speed of disbursement. Questioning the timeframe of assistance follows this.
Section 4 reviews the eligibility criteria and Section 5 whether the resources provided are
sufficient.
1. Characteristics of the ESF
Assistance under the new ESF will have the following characteristics: Regarding the amount
available, the maximum limit on access to resources is 50% of the country’s quota in the Fund. In
exceptional circumstances it shall be possible to exceed this limit. However, the disbursement
“shall also take into account the size and likely persistence of the shock”, which is determined by
the Fund. The assistance will be given in the form of concessional loans (with 0.5% interest rate),
repayments starting 5,5 years after first disbursement in ten semi-annual rates. There will be no
rescheduling of repayments possible. Loans shall be disbursed up to one year after the original
request with the option to extend the assistance up to two years. The decision on the extension is
made by the Fund given a detailed program by the country on how to use the resources in the
second year.
All PRGF eligible countries (thus with a per capita income of less than 895 $) are qualified to
obtain assistance under the ESF. However, these countries may only receive disbursements if
there are no other outstanding repayments to the IMF. Furthermore, “a country may not obtain
assistance from the Trust under the PRGF and the ESF at the same time”. Similarly, a country
may not have more than one ESF arrangement for the same shock.
As for the accounting, the current PRGF-Fund is to be renamed to a PRGF-ESF-Fund, which can
be accessed by both the PRGF and the ESF. Additionally, a PRGF-Fund and an ESF-Fund shall
be created, which can be accessed only by the respective programs.
The mechanism itself is supposed to work as follows:
First the country asks for a specific amount of assistance due to balance of payments or reserves
difficulties as a result of an exogenous shock. This amount will be granted without being
challenged by the IMF if the following criteria are met:
- Fund needs to be satisfied, that there is a balance of payment problem whose primary
source is a sudden and exogenous shock.
- Fund needs to assess, that there is no structural adjustment needed, which normally would
be implemented by a PRGF-agreement.
- Country needs to have submitted an I-PRSP, PRSP preparation status report, PRSP, or
APR plus an analysis in form of a Joint Staff Advisory Note concerning these documents
within the previous 18 months. (It is possible to make exceptions to this step, but this
procedure needs then to be completed till the first review).
In case a disbursement took place in the absence of a need, the country is expected to repay the
amount plus interest within 30 days. If the country fails to repay within that period, “the
Managing Director shall promptly submit a report to the Executive Board together with a
proposal on how to deal with the matter”.
2. Critical Assessment
First of all the establishment of such a facility was long overdue. Compensation Facilities have
been around for quite some time – but they were rarely used by Developing Countries as the
assistance was always very slow, expensive and granted only with certain conditions.
Hence the IMF’s attempt to create a concessional facility that would disburse resources quickly
after a shock is laudable, as the document reads: “When requesting a disbursement under an ESF
arrangement, the member shall represent that it has a need because of its balance of payments or
its reserve position or developments in its reserves. The Trustee shall not challenge this
representation of need prior to providing the member with the requested disbursement.”
(emphasis added).
However, there is a significant contradiction implied: Funds are supposed to be disbursed without
challenge – but only if certain criteria are met beforehand?!
According to the document assistance will be given when the IMF knows the following:
- First, there needs to be a balance of payment problem, which is “caused by an exogenous
shock”.
- Then the IMF checks whether structural adjustments need to be made in order to deal with
the shock that would normally be prescribed under a PRFG-Program. Only if this is not
the case assistance can be given.
- Next the Fund determines how the requested amount will be disbursed in order to deal
with the shock.
- After the assistance has been given the Fund examines the situation further in order to
determine if there was really a need for disbursement. If – according to the Fund – the
assistance was provided in absence of a need the money needs to be returned within 30
days.
The Fund does not provide a specific definition of what exactly constitutes an “exogenous
shock”. What happens if the shock is a combination of endogenous and exogenous factors as
often the case? Hence it is largely up to the discretionary assessment by the Fund, whether there
actually is a shock that would trigger the mechanism. Similarly, no guidelines are available of
when a “structural adjustment normally prescribed under a PRGF-Program” is needed and based
on what criteria. As these points are not clear it is not possible to determine if the amount of
money requested by the country can be released very quickly. This depends on how thoroughly
the Fund wants to examine if the criteria described above are met – and to his judgment of
questions such as: When does a decline of commodity prices present a shock or a normal market
behavior?
3. Adequate time-framework for assistance?
ESF loans are supposed to be given only for a year or a maximum of two years with repayment
starting after five years of the first disbursement. However, shocks tend to be more persistent. A
World Bank staff paper “reveals that the maximum effect of a commodity price shock is typically
achieved only after about four years” [1] (also see figure 1). Furthermore, the most common type of
shock to LICs, a drop of
commodity prices, tends to be
persistent with average half-lives
that typically excess five years [2].
Additionally, these findings make
it difficult comprehend why only
one loan will be given for one
shock: Is a continuous decline of
prices only one shock – or will
such a drop be reassessed after
some time?
Source: Varangis, Varma, de Plaa, Nehru (2004), p.9.
4. Eligibility?
Even though the criteria of a per capita income of 895$ makes 78 countries potentially eligible,
quite some crisis of the more recent history would still not have been covered with this new
facility. Considering only the natural disasters the following countries would not have been able
to benefit from the facility:
- El Salvador, Guatemala, Dominican Republic and Costa Rica (Storms such as Hurricane
Mitch 1998, but also Katrina or Gamma in 2005)
- Guatemala (Mudslides in 2005)
- Indonesia, Philippines and Seychelles (Tsunami 2005)
- Iran, Turkey, Indonesia (Earthquakes in 2005)
- Thailand, Yemen, Indonesia (Floods in 2005)
It is not clear, however, why countries with a higher per capita income than 895$ are excluded
from this facility. Are they less vulnerable to exogenous shocks?
Furthermore, there have been various crises in MICs (see natural disasters cited above, but as
well Malaysia 1997, Brazil 1998 etc.), which had tremendous effects on LICs as well. Hence it
does not make sense to exclude them from assistance, unless there are other instruments available
to them.
In face of these questions it is interesting to note that the previous Compensatory Financing
Facility (CFF) of the IMF was available to Non-PRGFs as well.
5. Will the assistance be sufficient?
The maximum total amount available to all countries would be $11,6 bn. Considering that India
with $3bn, Nigeria with $1,3bn and Pakistan with $0,7bn would get the greatest share it would
leave an average of $88 Mio. for each of the remaining 75 countries and only once over 4 years.
A comparison: The very first assessment by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) after the Tsunami of 2005 asked for a total assistance of $977
Mio. for six countries: Indonesia, Maldives, Myanmar, Seychelles, Somalia and Sri Lanka. Under
the ESF these countries together would have been allowed to request 515 Mio – for all different
kinds of shocks occurring through 2009.
In the light of other emergency assistance programs primarily in concerned with natural disasters
it is understandable that the ESF shall not cover the total loss by an exogenous shock.
However, we have to keep in mind the increasing magnitude and frequency of exogenous shocks
to developing countries over the last decades [3]. Similarly, let us remember that countries do not
only face natural disasters, but even more frequently commodity price shocks, Terms-of-Trade
shocks or exchange-rate shocks with similar costs. Each of them will require not a full, but a
partial compensation. In this regard a comparison does give an indication of whether the
assistance will be able to actually help.
In either case, these numbers are only theory as the ESF is supposed to be funded by donations of
industrialized countries. At the moment, however, only $2,8 bn shall be raised till 2009 (which
equals 25% of the total amount theoretically available to all countries) with annual contribution
of $700 Mio. by not further specified donors [4]. Gordon Brown already clarified that he expects
the oil-producing countries to share some of their windfall earnings due to the high oil price. By
now “8 industrialized countries” have endorsed the ESF – of which are only three known: Great
Britain will give $85 Mio, Japan $28,5 and Saudi Arabia with an amount not specified.
It seems like neither would be the resources available through the ESF sufficient to cover the
various kinds of external shocks experienced by developing countries, nor is the funding for that
even secured.
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