08. Jan. 2004
More arguments and counterarguments
"FTAP is a half-hearted solution compared to a complete and unconditional
cancellation of a country’s foreign debt."
The opposite is true! A singular complete debt cancellation will certainly
solve an immediate solvency problem. However , most in debt ed countries
are in debt because they find themselves in a structurally disadvantaged
position. Therefore it is quite likely that after a one-off cancellation
they will again take out new loans to finance their current account deficits.
In principle this makes sense – provided it can be guaranteed that the
new loans will not drive the country into a new debt trap, i.e.: the economy
will not again be burdened by debt beyond its ability to create and transfer
wealth. The consequences of such an over-indebtedness after debt relief
would then be the same neoliberal adjustments and cuts into benefits for
the most vulnerable sectors of society. Within a national economy individuals
as well as corporations (and in the USA even municipalities) are being
protected from this kind of debt trap by national insolvency laws. Internationally
it would be the FTAP, which would allow states to protect themselves from
the grip of their creditors. The FTAP would assure that (1) contrary to
present practice, creditors would have a real incentive to lend their
capital in a more cautious and responsible way; (2) once a crisis occurs
the creditors will have to shoulder their fair share of the losses, rather
than loading it all onto the sovereign debtor.
"Any decision making between debtors and creditors by a body,
which has been partly set up by the creditors will still imply an undue
influence by the creditors."
Why should creditors n t have a say in an issue, which genuinely concerns
them? Lending money does not automatically turn someone into a villain
who must be stripped of fundamental democratic and human rights, including
those to be heard in his own case and to be treated according to the rule
of law. Moreover, not only governments and banks from the North are creditors
to Southern sovereigns. Some debtor countries are considerably exposed
to other Southern governments. Even some NGOs and international loan co-operatives
happen to be creditors to Southern countries. A fair trial will not judge
over a person but over its deeds, anyway. The behaviour of creditors and
debtors is, among others things like the sustainability of total external
debt, subject to scrutiny in the course of an FTAP. Arbitration, where
both parties will jointly appoint the decision making body, is a common
procedure for resolving international disputes. Existing mechanisms like
the Paris Club or the HIPC Initiative, on the contrary, demonstrate, how
procedures which are dominated by only one of the parties, lead to meaningless
and sometimes absurd results. It would be naïve to assume that shifting
the one-sided decision making power to the debtor would produce less absurd
outcomes. A just solution will under any circumstances require impartial
decision making.
"In an FTAP it is still the governments which do negotiate; civil
society has no seat at the table."
Of course, debt must be negotiated by those who do have the formal competence
to do so on behalf of a sovereign state. Normally this is a legitimate
government, which in turn is bound by legal standards and parliamentary
approval. The fact that there is a lot to criticize about some Southern
(like, of course also , Northern ) governments must not suspend them from
their legal responsibilities. Of course, there are a handful of cases
where a government must not be allowed to meet with any international
cooperation. However, in those cases no debts are being paid either, which
could be negotiated. Normally we are dealing with governments which’s
formal legitimacy is out of question, but which are more or less prone
to rather serve themselves than those they are supposed to serve and who
have elected them. In those cases, in particular, a fair and transparent
arbitration process with a guaranteed right to be heard on the part of
civil society, provides a unique opportunity to enhance transparency and
participation regarding public finance. It would be truly naive to assume
that civil society organisations were genuinely the better representatives
of the interests of poor people suffering from the over-indebtedness of
their states. Corruption and nepotism (unfortunately) are no privilege
of public bodies. The single most important instruments to fight the vices
of bad governance is transparency. Media as well as civil society organisations
do have genuine roles to play in bringing it about. What is required,
moreover, is a functioning division of powers. This is exactly what an
FTAP brings about.
"Any state, which negotiates its debts under an FTAP will thus
recognize its legitimacy."
This would mean to assume that anybody going to court would thus recognize
automatically his opponent’s views as legitimate. In reality, calling
upon a neutral body for decision making is the logical second step after
a debtor has rejected to pay-up. If the indebted sovereign would not go
this second step, either of two things would happen: either, the creditor
on his part would seek legal protection to enforce his claim on the debtor.
To that end he would fall back on the legal venue agreed upon in the original
loan contract. Or the debtor would forego the opportunity to normalize
financial relations with his creditors; this could include not only his
immediate creditors, but also a broader group of potential donors. Larger
debtor countries may well be in a position to renounce on normal relationships
with the outside world for a while. Smaller countries, however, which
do depend on external sources not only with regard to the financing of
public budgets and current account deficits, but on a broader set of aspects,
will pay a very high price for an “autarky” strategy. If an in dividual
claim is legitimate and thus to be paid or not will be decided in the
course of the procedure by the arbitration panel.
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